The 8th Battalion of the Lincolnshire Regiment was a K3 Kitchener New Army Service battalion. It was formed in September 1914 at Lincoln from the initial rush of volunteers in September 1914. Eventually, they were brigaded in 63rd Brigade of the 21st Division.
What do we mean by K3? As each cohort of 100,000 volunteers from across the United Kingdom attested, the first 100,000 became known as K1, the second 100,000 as K2 and so forth. The battalions formed from these early volunteers were formed into New Army Divisions.
Initially the K1 Divisions were: 9th (Scottish), 10th (Irish), 11th (Northern), 12th (Eastern), 13th (Western) and 14th (Light [Infantry]).
This repeated for K2: 15th (Scottish), 16th (Irish), 17th (Northern), 18th (Eastern), 19th (Western) and 20th (Light).
As Regular Army battalions returned to the UK from the Empire, the numbering sequence altered and the K3, K4 New Army Service battalions were formed into: 21st to 26th and 30th to 41st Divisions.
Therefore, the expansion of a typical county regiment like the Lincolnshire regiment was as follows.
Pre August 1914.
1st Battalion – Regular Army in the UK.
2nd Battalion – Regular Army in the Empire.
3rd Battalion – Depot at Lincoln. Used for training new recruits before drafting to the 1st and 2nd battalions.
4th Battalion – Territorial Force battalion recruiting part time soldiers in Lincoln and the south of the county.
5th Battalion – Territorial Force battalion recruiting part time soldiers in the north of the county.
After the outbreak of war.
2nd/4th Battalion – A second line Territorial Force battalion.
2nd/5th Battalion – A second line Territorial Force battalion.
6th Battalion – A K1 New Army Service battalion.
7th Battalion – A K2 New Army Service battalion.
8th Battalion – A K3 New Army Service battalion.
9th Battalion – A K4 New Army Service battalion. Became a Home Service Reserve battalion.
10th Battalion – A K4 New Army Service battalion that recruited solely in the Grimsby area and became known as the ‘Grimsby Chums’, Lincolnshire’s addition to the Pals battalions.
11th Battalion – Became the reserve battalion for the 10th.
12th Battalion – Formed in 1916, it became a Labour battalion.
Kitchener New Army recruits parade outside of the racecourse Grandstand September 1914, Lincoln.
Returning now to the 8th Battalion – after a year’s training, the citizen soldiers were deemed ready for battle, such was the trained manpower shortage on the Western Front, as the opening of the Battle of Loos, 25th September 1915, loomed on the horizon.
The 8th Battalion crossed to France via Folkestone and Boulogne on September 10th 1915 with a strength of 28 Officers and 995 other ranks. These extremely brave but green troops had not been into action before and were thrown as part of the Army Reserve into the battle on the afternoon of 25th September. By the time the battalion was relieved on 27th September, they had suffered casualties of 22 Officers and 471 Other Ranks.
Why was the battle such a disaster for the 8th Lincolns and the British Expeditionary Force (BEF)?
1915 has become known as the year of manpower, artillery and shell shortages on the Western Front. The original BEF that arrived in France between August and November 1914 had been practically destroyed, only a handful of Territorial Force battalions and the arrival of the men of the Indian Army allowed the BEF to continue in the field during the winter of 1914/15.
Spring 1915 had seen the first complete Territorial Force divisions and the first Canadian soldiers arrive in France and Flanders to bolster the BEF, but alongside this, British industry had not yet geared up to produce the heavy artillery guns and shells that the army required.
The standard 18 pounder field gun was a useful weapon for firing shrapnel at an enemy in the open but for entrenched troops and belts of barbed wire, a heavy bombardment was required by 4.5”, 6”,9.2” and 60 pounder howitzers – all of these were in short supply, an issue exacerbated by the decision to open a second front at Gallipoli in April 1915. In addition, large quantities of shells had been purchased from the United States and many of these were found to be ‘duds’ and today the British Loos Memorial and CWGC cemetery stands at Dud Corner.
A view of part of Dud Corner cemetery and British Loos Memorial.
In March 1915 at Neuve Chapelle, the BEF commanded by Sir John French, had found that they could break into the German front line, but that they lacked the strength to break through into the open country beyond the enemy trenches. This then was the scenario in the lead up to the Battle of Loos.
The Battle of Loos opened on 25th September 1915 and is noteworthy in so much as it was the first time that the British had launched an offensive after using gas against the enemy. It was the first major British offensive action of the war, but was seen as a supporting action to a substantial French attack further south in the Third Battle of Artois. The Loos battle field was very flat and devoid of natural cover and British comments that the ground over which they were due to fight was wholly unsuitable were rejected by the French
Previous British attacks had been small-scale, but the attack of six divisions at Loos, three Regular, one Territorial and two Kitchener New Army, was a mighty offensive, but such was the lack of secrecy that the British press were referring to it in the run up as ‘The Big Push’. As already noted, the battle would take place on ground not of the BEF’s choosing and before their stocks of ammunition and heavy artillery were deemed acceptable, and so as soon as the battle commenced, heavy casualties occurred due to the insufficient weight of artillery bombardment in the preceding four days which had failed to destroy the German defenders and their machine guns. However, there was success on the first day in breaking into the enemy trenches at Loos, the village was captured, and at the Hohenzollern Redoubt at Auchy near Hulluch. Unfortunately, Sir John French’s decision to keep the reserves too far from the battle front meant that they were not able to exploit these initial successes and in the succeeding days the attack bogged down into attritional warfare for small gains.
As noted above, the major controversy of 25th September is Sir John French’s decision to keep the attacking reserve forces under his personal control, rather than allowing Sir Douglas Haig as Army Commander to have control. Initial gains from Loos to the Hohenzollern Redoubt had been made, albeit with heavy casualties, but just when Haig required the reserve forces to consolidate his gains, it was found almost impossible to communicate with French, and when communication was established, it was found that the reserves were held too far back from the battlefield. By the time that the reserve forces arrived on the scene, including 8th Lincolns, the Germans had had time to counter attack, improve their defences and thus the ‘green’ Kitchener battalions of 21st and 24th Divisions walked into a maelstrom.
After four gruelling night marches towards the front, the 8th Lincolns arrived at its position, five to eight miles behind the British lines. There they waited for their first taste of combat.
On September 25th, the first wave of the British offensive climbed out of their trenches and swept over parts of the German line, advancing behind a cloud of chlorine gas capturing Loos and charging headlong towards Hill 70. It was there that their advance came to a sudden halt in the face of stiffening enemy resistance.
By 10:30 a.m., five hours into the operation, fresh reserves were rushed forward to press the attack. Poor traffic control left the Lincolns and others inching forward on roads that were choked with wounded and enemy prisoners. After missing breakfast, hunger and thirst quickly sapped the men’s spirits. A sudden downpour soaked the officers and men to the skin.
By the time the lead elements reached the wood at Bois Hugo it was midnight. Exhausted and hungry, the attackers were greeted at their objective by enemy machine gun and rifle fire. The men of the 8th Lincolns took cover in hastily dug shallow trenches, but without picks, shovels, sandbags or barbed wire, they were unable to improve their defences. Despite the heavy enemy resistance, word was passed that the advance would resume the next day at 11 a.m.
The Germans had rushed up as many of their reserves as possible. The enemy positions opposite the 63rd Brigade were being steadily reinforced. Their positions included concrete machine gun bunkers and barbed wire over a metre high and six metres deep, all of which had remained untouched by the British barrages. Crucial to the reserves’ advance was the capture of the nearby Hill 70. Without this high ground in friendly hands, the entire assault would be subject to German enfilade fire. An attack at 9 a.m. to take the hill failed, partly due to robust German defences, but also because Allied artillery had mistakenly bombarded the attacking British troops.
Despite this, the 11 a.m. assault proceeded as scheduled. But as the 63rd Brigade readied itself to charge, the Germans counterattacked. The 8th Lincolns bore the brunt of it. As the fighting raged, Lieutenant-Colonel Harold Walter, led a charge against the enemy and was shot down, mortally wounded. A lieutenant named Falkner stepped over his body and blazed away at the Germans to keep them off. He too was shot and killed. Next, a captain by the name of McNaught-Davis tried to break up the attack with a trio of bayonet charges. They all failed and he too was seriously wounded from a bullet to the head. The Lincolns to the north of Bois Hugo held fast and fought with steadfastness and obstinacy. Running short of ammunition they took the cartridges from their dead and dying comrades and fought on.
By early evening, the 8th Lincolns position was growing increasingly perilous. Exhausted, with their numbers dwindling, their officers wounded or dead, and almost completely out of ammunition, the surviving Lincoln men found themselves surrounded by the Germans. Eventually, orders were received to withdraw some 1000 yards back to an old German front line trench, here the battalion and the troops of the 63rd Brigade were relieved by the Guards at about 4am on the 27th.
During their first ever action, the 8th Lincolns’ strength had been reduced from 28 officers and 995 soldiers to just six officers and 524 men. Of those who lost their lives only 10 have a known grave.
The 8th Lincolns paid a terrible price for the errors made by High Command.